Operational Risk Management for the Bat Unmanned Aerospace
System
Daniel J. Hall, Jr.
ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
July 21, 2014
Note: The following article was written for academic
purposes only. Unless properly cited and
referenced; all limitations, values, and figures are contrived by the author.
Operational Risk Management for the Bat Unmanned Aerospace
System
As a member of an expeditious Bat
unmanned aerospace system (UAS) operational team deployed to an undisclosed
location, the author was asked to assist in the development of an Operational
Risk Management (ORM) tool to enhance Bat safety and operations. According to Northrop Grumman Corporation
(2014), the Bat is, “Runway-independent and fully autonomous, the Bat is a
flexible, self-contained expeditionary system, designed to launch from a
pneumatic/hydraulic rail launcher and recover into a net recovery system”
(para. 2). While operating in such
austere conditions, it is paramount to conserve Bat assets and resources by
thoroughly analyzing all phases of the flight operations and mitigate the
associated risks.
As recommended by Barnhart, Hottman,
Marshall, & Shappee (2011), all members of the highly experienced Bat team
collaborate on the ORM tools for their specific circumstances. According to Barnhart et al. (2011), “The
main purpose for using the hazard analysis tool is to provide the user with a
systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and mitigating hazards early in
the operation” (p. 126). To that end,
the first task accomplished by the Bat team is to brainstorm all the hazards to
their flight operations. It is decided
that the basis for the list will be the limitations of the Bat UAS itself.
Preliminary
Hazard List (PHL)
The following list of hazards was
identified by the Bat team as critical items that must be evaluated prior to
each Bat operation.
1. Air Vehicle – Must pass preflight
inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be
review for downing discrepancies
2. Ground Control Station (GCS) - Must
pass preflight inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and
records must be review for downing discrepancies
3. Operational Area – Restricted airspace,
deconflicted with other users, and approved for Bat UAS operations only,
surface to 10,000 feet above ground level (AGL)
4. Radio Frequencies – Assigned and
approved for Bat UAS operations only
5. Launcher – Must pass preflight
inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be
review for downing discrepancies, oriented so as to launch into the wind (+/-
30 degrees of launch heading, on level ground, no obstructions over 20 feet
tall within 200 yards and +/- 30 degrees of launch heading
6. Launch Winds - Bat will not launch in
wind gusts over 25 knots
7. Recovery Net – Must pass preflight
inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be
review for downing discrepancies Oriented so approach is made into the wind
(+/- 30 degrees of approach heading), on level ground, no obstructions over 20
feet tall within 200 yards and +/- 30 degrees of approach heading
8. Recovery Winds - Projected winds will
be monitored and all efforts made to recover the Bat with wind gusts below 25
knots
9. Lightning - Operations will cease if
lightning is observed within 25 miles of the GCS
10. Rain - Bat will not operate in rainfall
in excess of .5 inches per hour
11. Icing - Operations in know icing
conditions are prohibited
12. Turbulence - Operations in areas of
forecasted severe turbulence are prohibited
13. Winds Aloft - Operations at altitude in
winds forecasted to be 50 knots or greater are prohibited
14. Minimum Crew - Consist of two UAS
pilots, two UAS sensor operators, and three UAS technicians
15. Fitness for Duty - All crew members
will be assessed for fitness for duty by the Shift Supervisor
16. Shift Profile - Crew shifts will be
limited to a maximum of 12 hours and no more than eight hours of total flight
time and no more than two launch and recovery evolutions each
As can be seen in the last section of this article, each item above
directly corresponds to an Assessment Item in the final ORM Assessment Tool.
Preliminary
Hazard Assessment (PHA)
Next the Bat team developed a scoring
table to be used in the final ORM Assessment Tool. The scoring table took into account the
probability and severity of each Assessment Item identified as a potential
hazard to their operations. Each
category was assigned a value of one to five with a five being the most
probable or most sever possibility.
These categories can be thought of as follows:
·
Probability
– “Frequent, probable, occasional, remote, or improbable” (Barnhart et al.,
2011, p. 124)
·
Severity
– “Catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible” (Barnhart et al., 2011, p.
124).
Operational
Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)
By implementing the following ORM
Assessment Tool prior to each and every Bat mission, the Bat team could ensure
that each facet of the flight and its associated hazards are thoroughly and
methodically evaluated. The ORM
Assessment Tool could potentially highlight an area with an elevated risk to
safety and alert the crew to be more cautions during that phase of the
operation. Finally, the ORM Assessment
Tool serves as a historical document as to the conditions that may have led up
to an incident, should one arise.
ORM
Assessment Tool
In order to account for both the
probability and severity of an assessment item the Bat team formulated the
following scoring table. The scoring
table averages the values give for both probability and severity. The average were then entered into the
table. Values of 1.0 through 2.0 were
assessed as Low Risk and color coded green.
Values of 2.5 through 3.5 were assessed as Moderate Risk and color coded
yellow. Values 4.0 through 5.0 were
assessed as High Risk and color coded red.
Figure 1.
Probability / Severity Scoring Table
(Developed by the author)
Next, the Bat team developed the
following ORM Assessment Tool to collate all the information evaluated during
the assessment and the corresponding scoring values assigned to them.
Figure 2. ORM Assessment Tool
(Developed by the author)
The Bat team Shift Supervisor was
assigned the duties of completing the ORM Assessment Tool above. The values entered into the form are based
upon the experience and judgment of the Shift Supervisor. Values of 2.5 or higher are also color coded
to draw the team’s immediate attention to the elevated risk associated with
that phase of the operation. Finally,
the overall average and risk level is highlighted at the bottom of the ORM
Assessment Tool.
References
Barnhart,
R.K., Hottman, S.B., Marshall, D.M., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems.
New York, NY: CRC Press.
Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2014). Bat unmanned aircraft system (UAS).
Retrieved from
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/BATUAS/Pages/default.aspx
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