Human Factors in
the Triton Ground Control Station
Ground control stations
(GCS) for unmanned aerospace systems (UAS) take many forms depending upon the
size and complexity of the system.
Austin (2010) wrote, “control stations, like the aircraft, come in all
shapes and sizes and are staffed appropriately to the number and specialty of
the tasks which they are required to perform” (p. 185). GCS can range from simple hand held devices,
to a single laptop computer, to mobile systems of networked computers and
monitors, to fixed based stations with satellite links and a team of operators.
Ground control stations
are used to send command and control (C2) information to the UAS. GCS may also be used to direct the operation
of UAS payloads and sensors when applicable.
Austin (2010) described the GCS as the “man-machine interface with the
unmanned air vehicle (or air vehicles) system” (p. 183). The GCS may also be used to receive information
such as vehicle telemetry status and sensor images or data from the UAS via
down-links (Austin, 2010). Another
factor that determines the complexity of the GCS is the operational distance
between the GCS and the UAS. UAS
operated within line of sight (LOS) of the operator are much less complex than
GCS used for UAS operations beyond the line of sight (BLOS) of the operator.
The most complex level
of GCS are required for UAS that are designed for high altitude, long endurance
(HALE) missions BLOS of the operator (Austin, 2010). “Systems such as Predator and Global Hawk may
launch their aircraft from a GCS on airfields relatively close to the theatre
of operation but, after launch, be controlled from a command center which may
be up to two thousand kilometers away” (Austin, 2010, p. 193). This type of GCS requires two way, satellite
linked, BLOS capabilities for transmission of C2, telemetry, and payload
data. To picture this type of GCS
picture the TV images that show the inside of a NASA control room.
According to Naval-technology.com
(n.d.), the Triton UAS “is operated from ground stations manned by four-man
crew including an air vehicle operator, a mission commander and two sensor
operators” (Ground Control Station). In
addition to the flight crew outlined above, complex UASs such as the Triton may
be monitored by a crew of engineers specializing in various subsystems of the
air vehicle. This crew of engineers
could dramatically increase the total number of humans either directly involved
in controlling the UAS or providing decision-making input. Since the Triton UAS “can fly 24 hours a day,
seven days a week with 80% effective time on station (ETOS)" (Naval-technology.com,
n.d., Ground Control Station); there is a high potential for human factors to
negatively impact the flight operation.
Two negative human
factors that may arise when so many people have access to the Triton GCS over
such an extended flight duration are complacency and miscommunication. Complacency can creep into the flight
operation when one member of the team incorrectly assumes that another member
is monitoring a system or flight parameter and will take corrective action if
necessary should an anomaly arise.
Miscommunications may be experienced between members of the team when
non-standard terminology is used or when checklists and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) are not adhered to. In
both cases, complacency and miscommunication, the most effective way to
mitigate risk is to enforce the use of prescribed terminology and adherence to
checklists and SOPs.
References
Austin, R. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems: UAVS design, development and deployment.
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Naval-technology.com. (n.d.). MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, United States
of America. Retrieved from http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/mq-4c-triton-bams-uas-us/
