The Use of Unmanned Systems in Remote Warfare: A Personal View

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

July 28, 2014

The Use of Unmanned Systems in Remote Warfare: A Personal View

One significant human factor that has made headlines in recent years is the psychological factors associated with using unmanned aerospace systems (UAS) to kill enemy combatants.  The issues revolves around UAS pilots who are stationed in the U.S. but are commanding UAS to kill combatants thousands of miles away.  Since the UAS can loiter for many hours over the target before and after the strike, the UAS pilots often witness the death and destruction they have unleashed.  Then, at the end of their shift, they go home to have dinner with the family.  In this case, the UAS pilot does not have the opportunity to come to grips with the mental baggage of taking the life of another human being before they have to walk through the door and assume a normal life in Suburbia, USA.

Manned aircraft pilots are also personally responsible for unleashing death and destruction upon enemy combatants.  However, in the case of manned aircraft the pilot usually does not loiter overhead to assess the effectiveness of their strike.  Another difference between UAS and manned aircraft is that the manned aircraft is usually operated from a deployed site close to the operational area.  By virtue of being deployed, the manned aircraft pilot has access to the emotional support of their comrades as well as other means to deal with the mental conflicts of killing another human being.

An ethical issue associated with using UAS in remote warfare the question of a fair fight.  A related example would be the use of snipers in warfare.  In the past, there’s been debate on whether it was ethical to use snipers on the battlefield.  The premise is that it’s not a fair method of killing one’s enemies.  The targeted individual has no indication he’s about to be killed and may not even be actively engaged in hostilities at the time the killing shot is taken.

Some have used this same argument for opposing the use of UAS in remote warfare.  However, in the author’s opinion, the same could be said of using artillery, long range missiles fired from ships, and bombs from manned aircraft.  In each of these cases the target may have no idea they are about to be struck.  This argument was described by Johansson (2011) as follows:

The physical distance detaches the fighter from the consequence of the use of their weaponry.  This might be considered specific for UAVs.  Of course, this is a psychological discussion going back to when the use of bow and arrows began—compared to killing a person up close, by sword. (p. 285)

That being said, the absence of a man in the cockpit of the UAS makes that platform no different than any other weapons of war.

In conclusion, the author fully supports the use of UAS in remote warfare.  When diplomacy fails and war is declared, each side takes advantage of whatever means available to defeat the opposition.  At the current time there are many countries with UAS capabilities and the author doesn’t believe any of these countries would refrain from using the UAS at their disposal.  Just as Fat Man and Little Boy saved the lives of an untold number of American personnel at the end of World War II, so too do UAS save American military personnel today.

For those that oppose the use of UAS in remote warfare, the author would like to pose the following question: “Which one of your closest loved ones do you want to send to an extremely dangerous place to try and kill extremely dangerous enemies?”  When diplomacy fails – someone has to do the job.  In that case and when available, the UAS gets the author’s vote!

References

Johansson, L. (2011). Is it morally right to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in war? Philosophy & Technology, 24(3), 279-291. doi: 10.1007/s13347-011-0033-8

Selection Criteria for Ikhana and ScanEagle UAS Pilots

Selection Criteria for Ikhana and ScanEagle UAS Pilots

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

July 25, 2014

Selection Criteria for Ikhana and ScanEagle UAS Pilots

As a human factors expert specializing in unmanned aerospace systems (UAS), the author has been tasked with identifying the crew positions required to operate the General Atomics Ikhana and Insitu ScanEagle UAS employed in oceanic environmental studies.  Additionally the author needed to determine the qualification, certification, and training requirements for each crew position.  In accomplishing these tasks, the author relied upon past training, experience, and online research.  The results are presented below.

The first task was to identify the required crew positions required to operate these UAS.  The job of piloting each UAS was assigned to a traditional crew of two.  Due to the complexity of each UAS, nature of assigned mission, and operations within the National Airspace System all pilots of both UAS will be held to the same training, certification, and medical standards outlined below.  For scheduling purposes, the more experienced pilot will be designated as the Pilot in Command.

Additionally, since each aircraft will be employed in an oceanic environmental study role, it was determined that a crew of two sensor operators will also be assigned to each aircraft in order to collect and analyze the required data.  The training and certification standards of all sensor operators will be in accordance with the specific sensor manufacturer recommendations.  These training and certification standards may vary across UAS platforms based upon the specific type of sensor being employed for the mission.  However, all sensor operators will be held to the same medical standards outlined below for the UAS pilots.

In order to determine the selection criteria for the UAS pilots, the author referenced the typical tasks required for Airline pilots, Copilots, and Flight Engineers (O*Net SOC Code 53-2011.00) as described in O*Net OnLine (2012).  The UAS pilots determined to be most highly qualified would possess and demonstrate experience, knowledge, and proficiency in the following tasks:

·         Work as part of a flight team with other crew members, especially during takeoffs and landings (Tasks).

·         Use instrumentation to guide flights when visibility is poor (Tasks).

·         Contact control towers for takeoff clearances, arrival instructions, and other information, using radio equipment (Tasks).

·         Monitor gauges, warning devices, and control panels to verify aircraft performance and to regulate engine speed (Tasks).

·         Respond to and report in-flight emergencies and malfunctions (Tasks).

·         Steer aircraft along planned routes, using autopilot and flight management computers (Tasks).

·         Monitor engine operation, fuel consumption, and functioning of aircraft systems during flights (Tasks).

·         Inspect aircraft for defects and malfunctions, according to pre-flight checklists (Tasks).

Additionally, the most highly qualified UAS pilot candidates would possess the following qualifications as outlined on a General Atomics Aeronautical Systems job posting on Linkedin (2014):

·         FAA Ratings such as FAA Private Pilot Certificate, FAA Instrument Rating, FAA Commercial Certificate, FAA Certified Flight Instructor, (CFI), FAA Certified Flight Instructor Instrument (CFII).

·         800 hours PIC with 500 Unmanned Aircraft hours in an OSGCS.

·         Graduate of DA or DES IO Course.

·         Familiarity with forms, records and publications as well as Contractor Flight and Ground Operations procedures and records (DCMA 8210).

Finally, in determining the medical requirements for all pilots and sensor operators the author was guided by Connor, Cooke, Pedersen, Pringle and Salas (2006) and Federal Aviation Administration (2007).  Connor et al. (2006) stated, “UAV flights may not require the operator to meet the same medical standards necessary for the pilot of a manned aircraft performing the same flight activity as the UAV” (pp. 76-77).  However, Federal Aviation Administration (2007) concluded, “A second-class medical certification was judged to be the most acceptable, considering that there were several factors that mitigated the risk of pilot incapacitation relative to those of manned aircraft” (p. iii).  As discussed in Federal Aviation Administration (2007), the author has determined that all US pilots and sensor operators shall meet the following medical requirements for a Second-Class-Commercial pilot:

·         Distant vision - 20/20 or better in each eye separately, with or without correction (p. 6).

·         Near vision - 20/40 or better in each eye separately (Snellen equivalent), with or without correction, as measured at 16 in (p. 6).

·         Intermediate vision - 20/40 or better in each eye separately (Snellen equivalent), with or without correction at age 50 and over, as measured at 32 in (p. 6).

·         Color vision - Ability to perceive those colors necessary for safe performance of pilot duties (p. 6).

·         Hearing - Demonstrate hearing of an average conversational voice in a quiet room, using both ears at 6 feet, with the back turned to the examiner or pass one of the audiometric tests (p. 6).

·         Ear, nose & throat - No ear disease or condition manifested by, or that may reasonably be expected to be manifested by, vertigo or a disturbance of speech or equilibrium (p. 6).

·         Blood pressure - No specified values stated in the standards. 155/95 Maximum allowed (p. 6).

·         Mental - No diagnosis of psychosis or bipolar disorder or severe personality disorders (p. 6).

·         Substance dependence & substance abuse - A history of substance abuse within the preceding 2 yrs. is disqualifying (p. 6).

References

Connor, O., Cooke, N.J., Pedersen, H.K., Pringle, H.L., & Salas, E. (2006). Human factors of remotely operated vehicles. Oxford, UK: JAI Press.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2007, February). Unmanned aircraft pilot medical certification requirements. Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/ua-pilot.pdf

Linkedin. (2014). UAV pilot – OSGCS qualified / non-deployable. Retrieved from http://www.linkedin.com/jobs2/view/17866436?trk=job_view_similar_jobs

O*Net OnLine. (2012). Summary report for: 53-2011.00 – airline pilots, copilots, and flight engineers. Retrieved from http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/53-2011.00

Operational Risk Management for the Bat Unmanned Aerospace System

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

July 21, 2014

 

Note: The following article was written for academic purposes only.  Unless properly cited and referenced; all limitations, values, and figures are contrived by the author.

 

Operational Risk Management for the Bat Unmanned Aerospace System

As a member of an expeditious Bat unmanned aerospace system (UAS) operational team deployed to an undisclosed location, the author was asked to assist in the development of an Operational Risk Management (ORM) tool to enhance Bat safety and operations.  According to Northrop Grumman Corporation (2014), the Bat is, “Runway-independent and fully autonomous, the Bat is a flexible, self-contained expeditionary system, designed to launch from a pneumatic/hydraulic rail launcher and recover into a net recovery system” (para. 2).  While operating in such austere conditions, it is paramount to conserve Bat assets and resources by thoroughly analyzing all phases of the flight operations and mitigate the associated risks.

As recommended by Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee (2011), all members of the highly experienced Bat team collaborate on the ORM tools for their specific circumstances.  According to Barnhart et al. (2011), “The main purpose for using the hazard analysis tool is to provide the user with a systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and mitigating hazards early in the operation” (p. 126).  To that end, the first task accomplished by the Bat team is to brainstorm all the hazards to their flight operations.  It is decided that the basis for the list will be the limitations of the Bat UAS itself.

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

The following list of hazards was identified by the Bat team as critical items that must be evaluated prior to each Bat operation.

1.      Air Vehicle – Must pass preflight inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be review for downing discrepancies

2.      Ground Control Station (GCS) - Must pass preflight inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be review for downing discrepancies

3.      Operational Area – Restricted airspace, deconflicted with other users, and approved for Bat UAS operations only, surface to 10,000 feet above ground level (AGL)

4.      Radio Frequencies – Assigned and approved for Bat UAS operations only

5.      Launcher – Must pass preflight inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be review for downing discrepancies, oriented so as to launch into the wind (+/- 30 degrees of launch heading, on level ground, no obstructions over 20 feet tall within 200 yards and +/- 30 degrees of launch heading

6.      Launch Winds - Bat will not launch in wind gusts over 25 knots

7.      Recovery Net – Must pass preflight inspection to include minimum essential equipment, logs and records must be review for downing discrepancies Oriented so approach is made into the wind (+/- 30 degrees of approach heading), on level ground, no obstructions over 20 feet tall within 200 yards and +/- 30 degrees of approach heading

8.      Recovery Winds - Projected winds will be monitored and all efforts made to recover the Bat with wind gusts below 25 knots

9.      Lightning - Operations will cease if lightning is observed within 25 miles of the GCS

10.  Rain - Bat will not operate in rainfall in excess of .5 inches per hour

11.  Icing - Operations in know icing conditions are prohibited

12.  Turbulence - Operations in areas of forecasted severe turbulence are prohibited

13.  Winds Aloft - Operations at altitude in winds forecasted to be 50 knots or greater are prohibited

14.  Minimum Crew - Consist of two UAS pilots, two UAS sensor operators, and three UAS technicians

15.  Fitness for Duty - All crew members will be assessed for fitness for duty by the Shift Supervisor

16.  Shift Profile - Crew shifts will be limited to a maximum of 12 hours and no more than eight hours of total flight time and no more than two launch and recovery evolutions each

As can be seen in the last section of this article, each item above directly corresponds to an Assessment Item in the final ORM Assessment Tool.

Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA)

Next the Bat team developed a scoring table to be used in the final ORM Assessment Tool.  The scoring table took into account the probability and severity of each Assessment Item identified as a potential hazard to their operations.  Each category was assigned a value of one to five with a five being the most probable or most sever possibility.  These categories can be thought of as follows:

·         Probability – “Frequent, probable, occasional, remote, or improbable” (Barnhart et al., 2011, p. 124)

·         Severity – “Catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible” (Barnhart et al., 2011, p. 124).

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)

By implementing the following ORM Assessment Tool prior to each and every Bat mission, the Bat team could ensure that each facet of the flight and its associated hazards are thoroughly and methodically evaluated.  The ORM Assessment Tool could potentially highlight an area with an elevated risk to safety and alert the crew to be more cautions during that phase of the operation.  Finally, the ORM Assessment Tool serves as a historical document as to the conditions that may have led up to an incident, should one arise.

ORM Assessment Tool

In order to account for both the probability and severity of an assessment item the Bat team formulated the following scoring table.  The scoring table averages the values give for both probability and severity.  The average were then entered into the table.  Values of 1.0 through 2.0 were assessed as Low Risk and color coded green.  Values of 2.5 through 3.5 were assessed as Moderate Risk and color coded yellow.  Values 4.0 through 5.0 were assessed as High Risk and color coded red.

Figure 1. Probability / Severity Scoring Table

(Developed by the author)

Next, the Bat team developed the following ORM Assessment Tool to collate all the information evaluated during the assessment and the corresponding scoring values assigned to them.

Figure 2. ORM Assessment Tool

 

(Developed by the author)

The Bat team Shift Supervisor was assigned the duties of completing the ORM Assessment Tool above.  The values entered into the form are based upon the experience and judgment of the Shift Supervisor.  Values of 2.5 or higher are also color coded to draw the team’s immediate attention to the elevated risk associated with that phase of the operation.  Finally, the overall average and risk level is highlighted at the bottom of the ORM Assessment Tool.

References

Barnhart, R.K., Hottman, S.B., Marshall, D.M., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. New York, NY: CRC Press.

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2014). Bat unmanned aircraft system (UAS). Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/BATUAS/Pages/default.aspx

Automated Flight Controls in the KC-130J and Northrop Grumman Bat

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

July 16, 2014

 

Automated Flight Controls in the KC-130J and Northrop Grumman Bat

The irony of automated flight control systems is that while they were designed to facilitate the assimilation of information and reduce pilot workload they can also induce a dangerous loss of situational awareness and complacency.  For example, Naval Air systems Command (2006) stated, “In complex human-machine systems like the KC-130J, operations, training and standardization depend on an elaborate set of procedures, which are specified and mandated” (p. 16-1).  However, once armed with proper training and fully knowledgeable in the elaborate set of procedures described in the KC-130J flight manual, a crew of four can now execute tasks that used to require a crew of six or more.  “The high level of automation on the KC-130J gives crews a variety of ways to obtain flight information and execute mission tasks” (Naval Air Systems Command, 2006, p. 16-1).

The Lockheed Martin C-130 has been a workhorse of military and civilian transport operations since the late 1950s.  This four engine aircraft was originally designed with rows of analog gauges and mechanically linked flight controls that allowed a crew of six or more to accomplish missions safely.  However, in the 1990s, the highly automated C-130J began to replace the legacy aircraft that had served their purpose for almost 40 years.  The C-130J’s glass cockpit design with heads up displays and automated flight control systems empowered her reduced crews with vast amounts of information and flight options.  But, as Naval Air Systems Command (2006) warned, “Such variability, if not properly managed, can lead to confusion, conflict, loss of situational awareness and increased workload levels. The use of a sound automation philosophy and Crew Resource Management (CRM) can combat these potential errors” (p. 16-1).

The purpose of the automation on the KC-130J is to assist the flight crew with mission accomplishment.  The level of automation used at any specific time should be the most appropriate to reduce crew workload during critical phases of flight, increase situational awareness and enhance mission effectiveness and safety. (Naval Air Systems Command, 2006, p. 16-4)

On the other end of the aviation spectrum, unmanned aerospace systems (UAS) have also benefited from technological advances in automated flight controls.  One such example is the Northrop Grumman Bat.  The Bat is a blended body UAS with a wingspan of approximately 12 feet (Northrop Grumman, 2014).  The Bat is describe as, “Runway-independent and fully autonomous, the Bat is a flexible, self-contained expeditionary system, designed to launch from a pneumatic/hydraulic rail launcher and recover into a net recovery system” (Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2014, para. 2).  The risks associated with the high speed accelerations during the pneumatic rail launch are greatly reduced with the automated flight controls.  In addition, highly automated flight controls, augmented with precise GPS positioning enable the Bat to consistently navigate to the center of its 16 foot capture net during recovery operations.

The automated flight controls on the Bat and provided by a user-friendly, point and click autopilot system from Cloud Cap Technology.  The “Piccolo Command Center (PCC) is the user interface for the Piccolo autopilot that provides a powerful flight planning and management software solution” (Cloud Cap Technology, 2014, para. 1).  Basic functions and features of the Piccolo autopilot system, as stated in the Key Features section of Cloud Cap Technology (2014) include:

·         Easy to define mission parameters and restrictions

·         Waypoint Insertion

·         Context Menus for common functions

·         Route Copy between aircraft

·         Easy route planning

·         Manage multiple aircraft on single map

·         High performance smooth zoom

·         2D and 3D terrain mapping

·         Integration with web mapping servers for elevation and imagery

This automated flight control system enables the 12 foot Bat to safely get airborne and recover in a manner that is typically beyond the limits of direct human pilot inputs.

References

Cloud Cap Technology. (2014, March). Cloud Cap Technology PCC: Piccolo Command Center. Retrieved from http://www.cloudcaptech.com/Sales%20and%20Marketing%20Documents/PCC%20Data%20Sheet.pdf

Naval Air Systems Command. (2006, March 1). NATOPS flight manual: Navy model KC-130J aircraft. San Diego, CA: Author.

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2014). Bat unmanned aircraft system (UAS). Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/BATUAS/Pages/default.aspx

A Modified Work Schedule for UAS Teams

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

July 1, 2014

A Modified Work Schedule for UAS Teams

In order to optimize operations and reduce fatigue in unmanned aerospace system (UAS) team members the author analyzed the Squadron’s current shift schedule.  Currently, the Squadron has four UAS teams assigned to operate the MQ-1B on a continuous basis.  An analysis of the current schedule revealed the UAS teams were assigned to a rotating shift schedule of six days of work followed by 2 days off.  Each work day during the scheduled period was broken down into three, 8.5 hour shifts (Day, Swing, and Night shift).  As each team completed their eight day, work/off cycle they were rotated to the next shift.  The author believes there are several human factors built into the current schedule that may be causing the extreme fatigue and inadequate sleep experienced by the UAS teams.

The first human factor lies in the rotating nature of the schedule itself.  As the UAS teams rotate through the three different shifts during the scheduled period they are unable to establish a circadian rhythm.  According to Orlady and Orlady (1999), “It can take from several days to more than a week to adjust to major changes” (p. 300) in circadian rhythm.  The author suggests that crews be assigned to the same shift schedule for the entire scheduled period.  This allows the teams to adjust to and remain on a circadian rhythm by providing a stable, predictable, and consistent work/off schedule.  Synchronizing one’s circadian rhythm ensures individual team members are alert during work periods while getting adequate rest during their off period.

The second human factor that may be causing the extreme fatigue is the six days of work followed by the two days off cycle.  Typically, a normal, long term work schedule consists of five days of work followed by two days of rest.  The author suggests the current schedule of six days of work followed by two days of rest may lead to a condition known as chronic fatigue.  “Since workers in shift systems require more time to recover than those working only day shifts, the observed chronic fatigue is likely reflective of continued inadequate opportunity for restorative sleep” (Miller, Tvaryanas, Platte, Swigart, & Colebank, 2008, p. 20).  In other words, the two day off period is not enough to ensure adequate rest and recovery in light of the six day work week and rotating shift cycle.

In order to optimize operations and reduce fatigue in Squadron’s UAS teams, the author has designed a modified work schedule to meet the Squadron’s 24/7, 365 days a year requirements while also ensuring adequately rested UAS teams.  The modified work schedule is centered on a three day, 12.5 hour shift scheduled followed by three days off.  Additionally, the swing shift has been eliminated and each crew will be permanently assigned to either the day or night shift.  These modifications are designed to ensure each UAS team is synchronized with their circadian rhythm by adapting to and remaining on a predictable work schedule.  An example of the modified work schedule is provided in Appendix A.  The pros and cons of this modified work schedule are outlined below:

Pros:

·         Provides a stable, predictable, and consistent work schedule of three days on and three days off during the scheduled period

·         Teams remain on the same shift during the scheduled period

·         Teams adapt to and remain on a set circadian rhythm during the scheduled period

·         Shifts begin and end at natural transition periods of the day – early in the morning and early in the evening

·         Reduces the total number of work days per the scheduled period – 12 versus 18

·         Reduces the total number of work hours per the scheduled period – 150 versus 153

·         Doubles the total number of days off per the scheduled period – 12 versus 6

·         Three day off period allows for more complete rest for team members while improving quality of life

·         Proposed schedule is close to complying with recently enacted FAA regulations for manned aviation crew duty / crew rest guidelines

Cons:

·         Increased work day – 12.5 hours versus 8.5 hours

·         Reduced amount of time between the end of one shift and the start of the next during scheduled work periods – 11.5 hours versus 15.5 hours

·         Reduced amount of work hours per the scheduled period – 150 versus 153

·         Reduced shift options – Day or night only, no swing shift

References

Miller, N.L., Tvaryanas, A.P., Platte, W., Swigart, C., & Colebank, J. (2008, January). A resurvey of shift work-related fatigue in MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft system crewmembers. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.

Orlady, H.W., & Orlady, L.M. (1999). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Appendix A 

Modified Work Schedule for UAS Teams

 

 

BLOS Capability Enables the RQ-4 Global Hawk to Live Up to Its Name

BLOS Capability Enables the RQ-4 Global Hawk to Live Up to Its Name

Daniel J. Hall, Jr.

ASCI 638 – Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide

June 28, 2014

BLOS Capability Enables the RQ-4 Global Hawk to Live Up to Its Name

The ability to command and control (C2) unmanned aerospace systems (UAS) beyond the line of sight (BLOS) of the operator has greatly expanded the utility of these systems.  BLOS capability has been enabled through the advancement of satellite communications (SatCom), global positioning system (GPS) technology, and long range data links.  One UAS that utilizes BLOS C2 to truly live up to its name is the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk.

The Northrop Grumman Global Hawk has been in development since “1995” (Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2008, p. 2).  With its ability to fly for more than 24 hours at altitudes above 50,000 feet mean sea level (Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2008), Global Hawk operators have used its BLOS capability to set records in long range operations.  According to Northrop Grumman Corporation (2008), “Global Hawk flew 7,500 miles nonstop across the Pacific to Australia on April 22-23, 2001, setting several new world records for UAS endurance” (p 2).

There are several methods available for conduction BLOS operations with UAS.  The employment of ground or air based radio frequency (RF) repeaters is one method to facilitate BLOS operations.  Another method is to capitalize on the ability to skip RF signals off of the atmosphere.  However, according to Avionics Today (2013) the primary method for conducting UAS BLOS operations is via “satellite communications” (para. 4).  Avionics Today (2013) details the use of the Inmarsat satellite communication system to enable BLOS operations:

There’s been new advancements on the SatCom side, particularly with Inmarsat and SwiftBroadband.  These new advances in service and terminals are changing the landscape dramatically.  Inmarsat’s new SwiftBroadband and I-4 satellites have ushered in an era of new smaller, lighter, less expensive terminals that can bring a beyond-line-of-sight data link capability to more UAV types and to more applications. (Avionics Today, 2013, para. 5)

The Global Hawk utilizes several links for satellite communications.  According to Northrop Grumman Corporation (2008), the Global Hawk communication package includes “Ku SatCom Data link, CDL LOS, UHF SatCom/LOS, Inmarsat, ATC Voice, Secure Voice” (p 5).  Specifically, the Ku SatCom Data link, UHF SatCom, and Inmarsat communications links are the components that provide the Global Hawk with its redundant BLOS capabilities.  Satellite communication links are provided for the Global Hawk via several antennas however, the Global Hawk’s distinctive hump just aft of the nose houses a large satellite dish for the primary Ku SatCom data link (Northrop Grumman Corporation, n.d.).

Research and development with BLOS technology offers the potential of greater reliability and flexibility for the UAS community.  Avionics Today (2013) stated, “When they have the capacity for an over-the-horizon type view, it gives them even more of an application across all platforms” (para. 3).  For example, Northrop Grumman recently demonstrated a “unique split link capability for Global Hawk that allows it to send mission data through a satellite link that is independent of the link used for command and control” (Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2014, para. 2).  However, in the author’s opinion, the high cost and restricted access of satellite communications may limit the commercial application of BLOS UAS capabilities for the foreseeable future.

References

Avionics Today. (2013, March 1). UAV communications. Retrieved from http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/issue/feature/UAV-Communications_78540.html#.U7AaLSDD9Ms

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2008, May). Facts: RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system. Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block20GlobalHawk/Documents/HALE_Factsheet.pdf

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2014, April 3). Global Hawk expands satellite communications capability. Retrieved from http://www.globenewswire.com/newsarchive/noc/press/xml/nitf.html?d=10075411

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (n.d.). Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk cutaway diagram. Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/GlobalHawk/Documents/Cutaway_Drawing_GH_Block_40.pdf

UAS Integration in the NAS

While the current state of sense and avoid (SAA) technology in unmanned aerospace systems (UAS) is still in the research and development stage; efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to safely integrate UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) are underway.  One such effort is the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative.  “NextGen represents an evolution from a ground-based system of air traffic control to a satellite-based system of air traffic management.  This evolution is vital to meeting future demand, and to avoiding gridlock in the sky and at our nation's airports” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013a, para. 1).

 

The requirement for UAS to be capable of sensing and avoiding other aircraft while operating in the NAS is mandated in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.  The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requires Federal agencies to “ensure that any civil unmanned aircraft system includes a sense and avoid capability” (Title III, Subtitle B, Sec. 332).  This act also calls upon Federal agencies to safely integrate UAS into the NAS as soon as possible but “not later than September 30, 2015” (FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Title III, Subtitle B, Sec. 332).  With the enactment of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 on February 14, 2012 the Federal Aviation Administration began the process of integrating UAS into the NAS.

 

A key component of the NextGen initiative that could facilitate the employment of SAA technology is the development and implementation of the satellite-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system.  “ADS-B makes use of GPS technology to determine and share precise aircraft location information, and streams additional flight information to the cockpits of properly equipped aircraft” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013a, para. 1).  ADS-B technology combined with future developments in SAA systems could be the key to unlocking the commercialization of UAS in the NAS.

 

Mid-air collision avoidance in today’s NAS is achieved through a variety of means such as ground based radar monitoring by air traffic control personnel, pre-established airport approach and departure procedures, specified air traffic routes and altitudes, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) onboard the aircraft, and the pilot’s visual scan of the airspace around the aircraft (Eshel, 2013b; Federal Aviation Administration, 2013b; Munoz, Narkawicz, & Chamberlain, n.d.).  “Unmanned flight will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use of SAA systems as an alternate method to comply with ‘see and avoid’ operational rules currently required of manned aircraft” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013b, p. 19).  According to the Federal Aviation Administration (2011), “efforts are underway to define System Requirements and Minimum Performance Standards for Sense and Avoid (SAA) equipment for UAS [however,] these efforts are in their early stages of requirements definition with completion schedule estimates beyond 2015” (p. 5).

 

The author believes that the full implementation of NextGen will be the key to unlocking the NAS for commercial UAS operations.  However, the author disagrees with the requirement that all UAS be equipped with SAA capability prior to operating in the NAS.  The main reason is that SAA technology is a long way from being operational on any UAS platform large enough to carry it let alone the overwhelming majority of smaller UAS platforms that will need miniaturized versions of the onboard SAA equipment.  The author suggests that the FAA develop rules and procedures that permit the use of UAS without SAA capability at altitudes below 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) while amending the rules to require all manned aircraft to operate at 1,100 feet AGL and above.  Obviously, certain exceptions to this altitude restriction could be granted for manned aviation operations such as crop dusting.  This would provide vertical separation of small UAS operating at 1,000 feet AGL and below and manned aircraft operating at 1,100 feet AGL and above.  Adopting rules and procedures like this would then require larger UAS intended to operate higher than 1,000 feet AGL to be equipped with SAA capabilities in order to avoid manned aircraft.

 

References

Eshel, T. (2013b, June 27). Airborne sense and avoid radars for RPAs. Defense Update. Retrieved from http://defense-update.com/20130627_absaa_sense-and-avoid-for-rpa.html

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, (2012). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aatf/legislative_history/media/faa_modernization_reform_act_2012_plaw-112publ95.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (2011, March 21). Evaluation of candidate functions for traffic alert and collision avoidance system II (TCAS II) on unmanned aircraft system (uas). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/TCASonUAS_FinalReport.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013a, May 13). What is NextGen? Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/why_nextgen_matters/what/

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013b, November 7). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) roadmap (1st ed.). U.S. Department of Transportation. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf

Munoz, C., Narkawicz, A., & Chamberlain, J. (n.d.). A TCAS-II resolution advisory detection algorithm. Retrieved from http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/people/cam/publications/gnc2013-draft.pdf